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should not be overruled and strained constructions placed 
upon other cases in order to reach a desired result. As l 
stated at the beginning of this dissent, it is impossible to 
distinguish the Brooks case from the one at bar, and any 
attempt to do so can lead to nothing but confusion. 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 7, 
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22811. In Bank. lVIar. 12, 1954.] 
MOHGAN A. STIVERS et al., Appellants, v. DEP AR'l'-
MENT OF EMPLOYMEN'l' et al., Respondents. 
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Excluded Employments-Agricul-
tural Labor.-Services performed by packing-house labor con-
stitutes "agricultural labor" within meaning of Unemployment 
Insurance Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering's 
Gen. Laws, Act 8780d), excluding such labor from operation 
of act, only if services are performed in employ of owner or 
tenant of farm on which materials in their raw or natural 
state are produced and if such services are carried on as an 
incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from 
commercial operations. (See Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 43, 
amending rule 7.1 of Department of Employment.) 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Excl-aded Employments-Agricultural Labor.-Part-
ners owning citrus groves and a packing-house which serves 
public to extent of 20 per cent of its total fruit-packing oper-
ations, the remaining 80 per cent coming from partners' own 
groves, cannot avoid commercial aspect of packing-house and 
their consequent liability for unemployment contributions on 
premise that principal pmpose of such house is to facilitate 
marketing of crops from their own groves; the test under 
Unemployment Insurance Act for determining whether activ-
ities of their. employees is agricultural is not principal purpose 
of enterprise, but whether services performed by employees 
are carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations. 
[3] !d.-Excluded Employments- Mode for Determining.-Pro-
visions in Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1945, pp. 1486, 
2230; see Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 42) for segregation of 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp (1950 Rev.), Unemployment Relief 
-Insurance Act,§ 16. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Unemployment Insurance, § 15. 
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employee's services on percentage basis and classification of 
aggregate employment by reference to how "one-half or more" 
of employee's time is spent, and requiring employer to keep 
accurate records in segregation of exempt and nonexempt em-
ployment, were adopted as a reasonable method for determin-
ing whether a speeific employee or group of employees, 
engaged part of time in exempt work and part of time in 
nonexempt work, is in taxable employment and entitled to 
coverage provisions of act; the provisions do not apply in favor 
of employer who conducts a single integrated operation having 
a definite commercial aspect so as to exempt such employer 
from liability for contributions in any period in which com-
mercial phase of such integrated operation may fall below 50 
per cent of total operation. 
[4] !d.-Excluded Employments-Agricultural Labor.-Mere :fact 
that plaintiffs' packing-house is a partnership, the partners 
owners of farms, does not render services performed by em-
ployees therein "agricultural labor" within meaning of Un-
employment Insurance Act on theory that they are in effect 
performing services for owners of land; the independent factor 
of "commercial nature" of packing-house enterprise, where 
this is shown, is sufficient to establish plaintiffs' liability for 
unemployment contributions. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Roy L. Herndon, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover unemployment insurance contributions 
paid under protest. Judgment for defendants after sustain-
ing their demurrer without leave to amend, affirmed. 
Ivan G. McDaniel and Kenneth N. Dellamater for Ap-
pellants. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Irving H. Perluss, 
Assistant Attorney General, William L. Shaw and Vincent 
P. Lafferty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents. 
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs brought this action to recover 
certain unemployment insurance contributions assessed and 
paid under protest pursuant to the Unemployment Insurance 
Act. (Stats. 1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering's Gen. 
Laws, Act 8780d.) The assessments were for the period Jan-
uary 1, 1944, through September 30, 1947, and amounted to 
$5,348.20. Plaintiffs pursued all administrative proceedings 
prerequisite to the institution of this action. Their claim of 
refund is predicated upon the contention that their packing-
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house employees were engaged in exempt "agricultural labor" 
and not in commercial activities, which latter activities are 
not exempted by the act. The court sustained defendants' 
demurrer without leave to amend, and from the ensuing 
judgment plaintiffs appeal. The record and applicable legal 
principles affecting the construction of the act support the 
propriety of the assailed judgment. 
It appears from the complaint that four of the Stivers 
brothers-Morgan A., Glenn, Howard, and Archie*-were 
members of a partnership which owned, among other prop-
erties, 357 acres of citrus groves. Morgan A. Stivers was 
the managing and operating partner of all properties of the 
"four-way partnership." A fifth brother, Raymond K. 
Shvers, owned separately an additional 70 acres of citrus 
groves. He and the four-way partnership formed a packing-
house partnership, known as the Stivers Packing Company. 
During the tax period involved the packing company owned 
and operated a packing-house, under the management of 
Raymond K. Stivers. All the fruit from the Stivers' groves-
the combined 427 acres-was packed in this packing-house 
and constituted 80 per cent of the entire amount of products 
handled; the remaining 20 per cent of the total fruit packed 
came from the groves of others. Raymond K. Stivers had a 
one-third interest in the Stivers Packing Company, and the 
four-way partnership had a two-thirds interest. All the cost 
of operating the Stivers' groves was paid by the packing com-
pany. These groves were charged with their proportionate 
expense on the following basis : a credit was allowed for all 
receipts from the respective fruit sold, against which was 
made a charge per box for packing, plus an additional charge 
for the particular operation and maintenance cost, and the 
balance then accrued in favor of Raymond K. Stivers or 
the four-way partnership· according to the grove accounting. 
The packing-house partnership did not operate, maintain or 
manage any "non-Stivers" citrus gToves. It is alleged in 
the complaint that ''the primary and sole purpose of said 
packinghouse partnership was to produce, harvest, pick, sell 
and ship citrus fruits'' from the Stivers' groves; but the 
general allegation that this was the ''sole'' purpose must 
fall before the specific, contradictory allegation that "not 
more than 20% of the total fruit packed" came from the 
groves of others. The labor here in question involves only 
*Now deceased, and his son, .J. B. Stivers, as executor, ,joins as a 
plaintiff. 
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the services rendered by the employees of the packing-house 
partnership working in the packing-house. 
Plaintiffs' liability for contributions on the wages paid the 
packing-house employees depends on whether or not such 
employees may be classified as "agricultural labor." (1] The 
Unemployment Insurance Act excludes, without definition, 
"agricultural labor" from the term "employment" within 
its coverage provisions. The necessary definition for admin-
istrative purposes has been supplied by rule of the Depart-
ment of Employment. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 43, 1 amend-
ing rule 7.1 following its interpretation in California Ernp. 
Corn. v. Kovacevich, 27 Cal.2d 546,551-553 [165 P.2d 917].) It 
thus appears that packing-house labor, in order to be classed 
as agricultural, must be ''services performed ... in the 
employ of the owner or tenant of a farm on which the mate-
rials in their raw or natural state were produced" and 
''carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations 
as distinguished from ... commercial operations." 
Defendants properly rely upon the rationale of California 
Emp. Com. v. Butte County Rice Growers Assn., 25 Cal.2d 
624 [154 P .2d 892], as determinative of plaintiffs' liability 
for contributions under the act. That case involved employees 
of an incorporated farmers' cooperative association operating 
a warehouse located near a railroad siding for the storage 
of rice and grain for shipment to market-services performed 
1
' 'Agricultural labor exempted from 'employment' by Section 7 (a) 
of the Act includes all services performed: 
''a. On a farm, in the employ of any person, in connection with cul-
tivating the soil, or in connection with raising or harvesting of any 
agricultural or horticultural commodity; the raising, feeding, and man-
agement of livestock, poultry and bees; which includes among others, 
the spraying, pruning, fumigating, fertilizing, irrigating and heating 
which may be necessary and incident thereto. 
''b. In the employ of the ownm or tenant of a farm on which the 
materiRis in their raw or natural state were produced, in connection 
with the drying, processing, packing, packaging, transporting, and 
marketing of such materials. 
''c. In the employ of the owner or tenant of a farm with respect to 
ordinary farming operations in connection with the operation, manage-
ment, conservation, improvement, or maintenance of such farm and its 
tools and equipment, if substantially all of such services are performed 
on a farm. 
"d. The provisions of subsection (b) and (c) are not applicable with 
respect to the services referred to unless such services are carried on as 
an incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from manu-
facturing or commercial operations. Nor are the provisions of said 
subsections applicable to services performed in commercial canning or 
eommercial freezing.'' 
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off the farm following the harvesting of the crops. The asso-
eiation 's storage and shipping facilities were available not 
only to members but also to others upon payment of a nominal 
application fee, and under the terms of its state warehouse 
license the cooperative was obligated to serve the public in 
providing storage accommodations. Under such circumstances 
the warehouse was held to be a commercial enterprise, helpful 
to but separate and apart from the farming operations, and 
the activities of the employees were classified as commercial 
rather than agricultural within the concept of the act. 
[2a] Plaintiffs seek to avoid the commercial aspect of their 
packing-house upon the premise that its principal purpose 
was to facilitate the marketing of the crops from the Stivers' 
groves. However, the test under the act is not the principal 
purpose of the enterprise but whether the services performed 
by its employees were ''carried on as an incident to ordinary 
farming operations as distinguished from . . . commercial 
operations.'' Thus significant is the fact that the packing-
house served the public to the extent of 20 per cent of its 
total fruit packing operations, a sizable amount attesting 
to its commercial character. Plaintiffs argue that this 20 
per cent factor is not of controlling importance, since 80 per 
cent of the fruit handled in the packing-house came from 
Stivers' groves and such packing services in readying their 
own farm products for marketing constituted agricultural 
labor. [3] Accordingly, they cite the act's provision for 
segregation of the employee's services on a percentage basis 
and classification of the aggregate employment by reference 
to how "one-half or more" of the employee's time is spent. 
(§ 7.1, Stats. 1945, pp. 1486, 22302 ; Admin. Code, tit. 22, 
§ 42 (b), effective April 1, 1945.) The employer is required 
to keep accurate records in segregation of the exempt and non-
exempt employment. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 42 (a) .3 ) 
"''If the services performed during one-half or more of any pay period 
by an employee for the person employing him constitute employment, all 
the services of such employee for such period shall be deemed to be 
employment; but if the services performed during more than one-half of 
any such pay period by an employee for the person employing him do not 
constitute employment, then none of the services of such employee for 
such period shall be deemed to be employment. .As used in this para-
graph the term 'pay period' means a period (of not more than thirty-one 
consecutive days) for which a payment of remuneration is ordinarily 
made to the 'employee by the person employing him.'' 
"'Where employees perform services for an employer in both exempt 
and nonexempt employments, such employer shall maintain accurate 
records showing the hours worked by and the wages paid to employees 
in each of said employments. Such segregation must be made with 
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But these provisions appear to have been adopted as a reason-
able method of determining whether a specific employee or 
group of employees, engaged part of the time in exempt work 
and part of the time in nonexempt work, is in taxable em-
ployment and entitled to the coverage provisions of the 
act. They do not apply in favor of an employer who con-
ducts a single integrated operation having a definite com-
mercial aspect, such as the packing-house in question, so as 
to exempt such employer from liability for contributions 
in any period in which the commercial phase of such single 
integrated operation may fall below 50 per cent of the total 
operation. A contrary construction would be unreasonable 
in view of the broad coverage intended by the act in fixing 
taxable employment. (California Emp. Stab. Com. v. Lewis, 
68 Cal.App.2d 552, 554 [157 P.2d 38], and cases there cited.) 
Accordingly, the comparative percentage measure of the 
packing-house services rendered to the public does not remove 
the force of that consideration in reflecting the commercial 
nature of plaintiffs' packing-house enterprise. 
[4] Nor does it matter that here plaintiffs' packing-house 
is a partnership rather than a corporate entity as was the 
situation in California Emp. Com. v. Butte County Rice 
Growers .Assn., sttpra, 25 Cal.2d 624, so that the warehouse 
activities were not services performed for the owner or tenant 
of a farm within the concept of "agricultural labor" under 
the act. To this point plaintiffs maintain that, save in ex-
ceptional 'circumstances, a partnership under California law 
is not regarded as an entity distinct from the individuals 
composing it. (Reed v. Industrial Ace. Com., 10 Cal.2d 191, 
192-193 [73 P.2d 1212, 114 A.L.R. 720] ; Park v. Union Mfg. 
Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 401, 407 [114 P.2d 373] .) Accordingly, 
they claim that since they constituted the packing-house part-
nership and also owned the Stivers' groves on which the 
citrus fruit was produced, the packing-house employees were 
in effect performing services for the owners of the land. In 
opposition to plaintiffs' argument, defendants cite the act's 
express definition of an "employing unit" to mean "any 
individual or type of organization, including any partner-
ship ... corporation .... " ( § 8.5; Stats. 1937, p. 2053; 
am. without material changes by Stats. 1947, p. 2627.) Such 
provision, they claim, in effect declares that, for the purposes 
respect to each individual employee rather than on the basis of the 
employer's operations as a whole and may be made on a percentage or 
other basis found by the Department to be reasonable.'' 
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of the act, a partnership is to be regarded as a separate entity. 
As a factual consideration indicating the distinct nature of 
the packing-house partnership, defendants point out the dis-
proportionate ownership interests therein of the member-
growers of the Stivers' fruit: the four-way Stivers' partner-
ship owning some five-sixths of the total citrus acreage and 
two-thirds of the packing-house company; Raymond K. Sti-
vers individually owning one-sixth of the citrus acreage and 
one-third of the packing-house company. However, it is 
unnecessary to do more than note here the respective con-
tentions as to the ''separate entity'' of plaintiffs' partnership, 
for it is the independent factor of the ''commercial nature'' 
of the packing-house enterprise which we deem sufficient to 
establish plaintiffs' liability for the unemployment contribu-
tions in question. 
[2b] Undoubtedly, services performed in a packing-house 
operated by and for the farmer-grower of agricultural prod-
ucts may constitute "agricultural labor" under the act pro-
vided "such services are carried on as an incident to ordi-
nary farming operations as distinguished from . . . commer-
cial operations.'' But here the producers of the fruit formed 
a packing-house partnership which functioned not alone in 
their behalf in the marketing process. Rather, the packing-
house also served the public to the substantial extent of 20 
per cent of its total fruit packing services. As so operating 
for profit on a commercial scale, the packing-house became 
a single integrated enterprise operating much the same as any 
business concern, and it should not be treated any differently 
insofar as bearing its proportionate share of the social respon-
sibilities flowing from the state unemployment insurance law. 
Consistent with a liberal construction of the act to effectuate 
its intended coverage (California Emp. Com. v. Butte County 
Rice Growers Assn., supra, 25 Cal.2d 624, 630), the commer-
cial packing-house labor here involved was not exempt em-
ployment. Accordingly, plaintiffs' liability for unemployment 
contributions as here assessed cannot be avoided on the facts 
alleged in their complaint. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, .J., Edmonds, .T., and Traynor, .T., 
concurred. 
CARTER, ,J., Dissenting.-! adopt as my dissenting opin-
ion in this case the able and well reasoned opinion prepared 
by Presiding ,Justice Shinn, which was concurred in by Jus-
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tices Wood and Vallee, when this case was before the District 
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three. 
"Plaintiffs sued to recover employer's taxes paid under 
protest under assessments levied under section 45.11 (d) of 
the California Unemployment Insurance Act (Deering's Gen. 
Laws, Act 8780(d).) The demurrer of James G. Bryant as 
Director of Employment and other defendants was sustained 
without leave to amend and plaintiffs appeal from the ensu-
ing judgment. The assessments were for the period Jan-
uary 1, 1944, through September 30, 1947, and amounted 
to $5,348.20. Plaintiffs pursued all necessary administrative 
proceedings prerequisite to court action. 
"The labor for which the assessments were levied was 
performed in a packing house and the question is whether 
it was agricultural labor and hence exempt under the act. 
It was alleged in the complaint that plaintiffs Morgan A. 
Stivers, Glenn Stivers, Howard Stivers and Raymond K. 
Stivers were, during the period in question, members of a 
partnership which owns, with numerous other assets, 357 acres 
of citrus groves. Subsequently, Raymond K. Stivers died 
and J. B. Stivers, as executor of his estate, joins with the 
others as a plaintiff. Raymond K. Stivers owned separately 
an additional 70 acres of groves. All the property stood in 
the name of Morgan A. Stivers or of himself and his wife 
and he had the management of all the properties of the part-
nership. The same four parties owned a packing house and 
this was managed by Raymond K. Stivers. Eighty per cent 
of the products handled in the packing house came from 
Stivers' groves and not over 20 per cent from the groves of 
others. The packing house operations were conducted by a 
partnership consisting of the four owners of the groves, 
Raymond K. Stivers having a one-third interest in this part-
nership and the other members a two-thirds interest. All 
the cost of operating the groves was paid by the packing 
house partnership. The several groves were charged with 
this expense, and were credited with all the receipts from 
products sold, against which was a charge per box for pack-
ing, plus an additional charge for the operation and main-
tenance of the groves owned by Raymond K. Stivers and 
those owned by the owning partnership. The packing house 
partnership did not operate, maintain or manage any non-
citrus groves; the primary and sole purpose of the packing 
house partnership was to produce, harvest, pick, sell and 
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ship citrus fruits from the Stivers' groves. It was alleged 
that two-thirds of the (Stivers) citrus fruits packed were 
produced in the groves of the owning partners and one-third 
in the groves owned by Raymond K. Stivers. 
''Our discussion will be devoted to the following proposi-
tions: If the packing house partnership, as distinguished 
from its individual members, is to be regarded as a separate 
entity, and the employing unit of the packing house workers, 
or if the principal packing house operation was not merely 
incidental to the farming operation, the labor would not be 
agricultural labor under the terms of the act and the regu-
lations of the Department of Employment, whereas, if the 
packing house partnership was merely an agency of the 
owners of the groves and the individuals who compose both 
partnerships were, in reality, the employers, and if the prin-
cipal packing house operation was merely incidental to the 
farming operation, all the labor in the packing house would 
be regarded for unemployment tax purposes as agricultural 
labor and hence exempt. We are of the opinion that the latter 
is the case. 
''Section 7 (a) of the act provided that the term 'em-
ployment' does not include 'agricultural labor.' The act 
did not define agricultural labor. During the year 1944 and 
until January 1, 1945, there was in force rule 7.1 of the 
department defining agricultural labor and which read as set 
out below.1 
"As of April 1, 1945, without material change, rule 7.1 be-
came section 43 of title 22 of the California Administrative 
'' 
1
' Agricultural Labor Defined-The term "Agricultural Labor" in-
cludes all services performed: 
" '(1) By an employee on a farm, in connection with the cultivation 
of the soil, the raising and harvesting of crops, the raising, feeding, 
management of livestock, poultry and bees; which includes among others, 
the spraying, pruning, fumigating, fertilizing, irrigating and heating 
which may be necessary and incident thereto; 
" '(2) By an employee in connection with the drying, processing, 
packing, packaging, transporting, and marketing of materials which are 
produced on the farm or articles produced from such materials, providing 
such drying, processing, packing, packaging, transporting, or marketing 
is carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations as dis-
tinguished from manufacturing or commercial operations. 
'' 'The services hereinabove set forth do not constitute agricultural 
labor unless they are performed by an employee of the owner or tenant 
of the farm on which the materials in their raw or natural state were 
produced. Nor do such services constitute agricultural labor if they are 
carried on as an incident to manufacturing or commercial operations.' '' 
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Code, which was amended June 1, 1945, to read as set out 
below.2 
"In California Ernp. Com. v. Kovacevich, 27 Cal.2d 546 
[165 P.2d 917], former rule 7.1 was interpreted to mean that 
packing house labor, in order to be classed as agricultural, 
must be performed by an employee of the owner or tenant 
of the farm on which the materials are produced, and the 
services must be carried on as an incident to ordinary farming 
operations as distinguished from manufacturing or com-
mercial operations. "\Vith somewhat different arrangement, 
section 43 of title 22 of the California Administrative Code 
imposed the same conditions. 
''Inasmuch as 80 per cent of the packing services were per-
formed on Stivers' fruit and 20 per cent on other fruit, cer-
tain other enactments are to be considered. 
"By Statutes 1939, pages 2850-2853, section 7 of the Unem-
ployment Reserves Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1226) was amended to 
read as set out below.3 The same provision is found in section 
""'Agricultural labor exempted from "employment" by Section 7 (a) 
of the Act includes all services performed: 
'' '(a) On a farm, in the employ of any person, in connection with 
cultivating the soil, or in connection with raising or harvesting of any 
agricultural or horticultural commodity; the raising, feeding, and man-
agement of livestock, poultry and bees, which includes among others, the 
spraying, pruning, fumigating, fertilizing, irrigation and heating which 
may be necessary and incident thereto. 
" '(b) In the employ of the owner or tenant of a farm on which the 
materials in their raw or natural state were produced, in connection with 
the drying, processing, packing, packaging, transporting, and marketing 
of such materials. 
" '(c) In the employ of the owner or tenant of a farm with respect 
to ordinary farming operations in connection with the operation, manage-
ment, conservation, improvement, or maintenance of such farm and its 
tools and equipment, if substantially all of such services are performed 
on a farm. 
" '(d) The provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are not applicable 
with respect to the services referred to unless such services are carried 
on as an incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from 
manufacturing or commercial operations. Nor are the provisions of said 
subsections applicable to services performed in commercial canning or 
commercial freezing.' " 
"
8 (1J) 'If the services performed during one-half or more of any 
pay period by an employee for the person employing him constitute em-
ployment, all the services of such employee for such period shall be 
deemed to be employment; but if the services performed during more 
than one-half of any such pay period by an employee for the person 
employing him do not constitute employment, then none of the services 
of such employE'e for such period shall be deemed to be employment. As 
used in this paragraph the term ''pay period'' means a period (of not 
more than thirty-one consecutive days) for which a payment of re-
muneration is ordinarily made to the employee of the person employing 
him.''' 
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7.1 of the act (Stats. 1954, pp. 1486 and 2230; 3 Deering's 
Gen. Laws, § 8780 (d)). It also appears as section 42 (b) of 
title 22 of the California Administrative Code, effective April 
1, 1945, which contains the additional provisions set out 
below.4 
. "We may inquire first whether it appeared from the allega-
tions of the complaint as a matter of law that the packing 
services were incidental to a commercial operation as dis-
tinguished from the farming operation. It was alleged that 
they were merely incidental to the latter and we think it may 
not be questioned that the facts pleaded would have justified 
a finding that this allegation was true. We can conceive of no 
reason to doubt that the principal purpose of the packing 
house operation was to facilitate the marketing of the crops 
from the Stivers' groves. 
"Plaintiffs contend that the share of the services amount-
. ing to 20 per cent rendered to the public was likewise in-
cidental to the farming operation. We deem it unnecessary to 
decide this question. Even if it be assumed that the labor per--
formed in packing nonStivers fruit, if considered by itself, 
would be subject to tax, it should be deemed tax exempt under 
former section 7 of the act, which became section 7.1 under the 
1945 amendment, for the reason that more than 50 per cent of 
the entire service was agricultural. It is therefore immaterial 
whether the 20 per cent of services on nonStivers fruit were 
agricultural and tax exempt, or nonagricultural and tax sub-
ject, inasmuch as the entire service was rendered to the same 
employer. 
"Exemption from tax liability rests upon the further con-
dition that the packing house laborers were working for the 
owners of the groves. \Ve are satisfied that they were. 
''Any type of organization, including a partnership, may 
become an employing unit ( § 9). So may a partnership be 
an owner or a tenant. Granting that the packing house part-
nership was nominally the employing unit with respect to 
the packing house labor, and recognizing that title to the 
groves was not vested in the partnership as an entity distinct 
from .its members, we cannot fail to recognize the fact that the 
'''(a) 'Where employees perform services for an employer in both 
exempt and nonexempt employments, such employer shall maintain 
accurate records showing the hours worked by and the wages paid to 
employees in each of said employments. Such segregation must be made 
with respect to each individual employee rather than on the hasis of 
the employer's operations as a .whole and may be made on a percentage 
or other basis found by the Department to be reasonable.' '' 
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groves belonged to the individuals who composed the packing 
house partnership. This fact establishes that the individuals 
were in a real sense the employers of the workers. 
''Defendants say that the decision in California Ernp. Com. 
v. Butte County etc. Assn., 25 Cal.2d 624 [154 P.2d 892], 
'is vie·wed to be determinative of the present controversy.' 
Vv e believe otherwise. The defendant was a cooperative asso-
ciation, incorporated as a nonprofit farmers' organization 
under civil code sections. It had 48 members, paying $300 
each, and 23 applicants for memberships who had paid $10 
each. All were entitled to the handling and marketing ser-
\'ICes. The association conducted a warehouse business in 
which it was obliged to receive and store products offered to 
it by the general public without discrimination; it also pur-
chased and sold to its members and applicants, and might 
also sell to the public, merchandise commonly used in farm-
ing operations; it also maintained a public scale for the use 
of the public. Any profits made in its operation were dis-
tributed ratably among the regular members. Applicants 
for membership received nothing. The association was not the 
owner, tenant or operator of any farm. The court said: 
'Upon this record the conclusion is inescapable that the de-
fendant association is in essence a commercial enterprise.' 
It was claimed for the association that it was a mere agency 
through which the members and applicants processed and 
marketed their products. The court rejected this claim, 
stating (p. 636) : 'Such observation is not only squarely at 
variance with the facts of this case-demonstrating that the 
defendant association in all its services functions as a unit 
wholly independent of the farmers comprising its membership 
-but is likewise contrary to the elementary legal principle 
that a corporation is a complete legal entity separate and 
apart from the individuals who own it.' It was therefore 
held that the operation of the various enterprises while help-
ful, were 'not an incident to ordinary farming operations as 
distinguished from . . . commercial operations,' and that the 
labor employed therein was not tax exempt. The features 
of the operations in that case which the court deemed to be 
controlling are absent from the present case. The factual 
features of the present case from which we conclude that the 
major part of the services here in question was incidental to 
a farming operation, were absent from the former case. The 
court in that case did not hold, as respondents contend, that 
any service rendered to the public would make the running of 
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a packing house a commercial operation. It did hold that the 
commercial operations of the Rice Growers Association were 
not incidental to a farming operation. 
''Respondents contend that the Stivers partnership was an 
entity separate from the members thereof, just as the Rice 
Growers Association was an entity separate from its mem-
bers. The distinctions are obvious. The principal differences 
are that the individuals who composed the two Stivers part-
nerships were the sole owners of the groves and the packing 
house, operated both the farming and the packing operations 
through their respective managers, that all the acts of their 
managers were the acts of the partners, and all the duties 
and obligations of the partnerships the duties and obligations 
of the individual members. Certainly it could not be con-
tended that the groves were in an ownership distinct and 
separate from that of the individual partners. 
''A partnership may be regarded as a legal entity for 
some purposes and not for others. It may in its partnership 
name become an employer of labor so as to effectively bind its 
members, but in doing so it acts on their behalf and not as a 
separate entity. The theory that a workman employed by a 
partnership is not the employee of each member of the part-
nership was expressly rejected in Reed v. Industrial Ace. 
Corn., 10 Cal.2d 191 [73 P.2d 1212, 114 A.L.R. 720]. Reed 
was employed by a partnership, Gordon and Mellott. Mel-
lott became insured before he formed a partnership with 
Gordon. Reed was denied a compensation award against the 
insurer on the theory that he was an employee of the part-
nership, which was not insured. The award was annulled. 
The court held that Reed was the employee of the individuals 
who composed the partnership and was therefore insured. 
We quote from the opinion a passage which we regard as 
conclusive on the point: 'The underlying fallacy in re-
spondent's argument is the assumption that the partnership 
is a distinct unit, separate from the members thereof. Oc-
casional suggestions of this "entity" theory of partnership 
are found in statutes or decisions, but apart from exceptional 
·situations, a partnership is not considered an entity, but an 
association of individuals. (See First Nat. T. & S. Bank v. 
Ind1tstrial Ace. Com., 213 Cal. 322, 331 [2 P.2d 347, 78 A.L.R. 
1324] ; 9 Cal.L.Rev. 119.) In consonance with this view, an 
employee of a partnership is an employee of each of the 
partners, and no individual partner may escape liability to 
such employee on the ground that only the partnership and 
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not the individuals composing it can be held. It is immaterial 
whether the liability of the partners in this situation is joint 
and several, or joint, for even in the case of joint liability, 
a several judgment may be had against an individual partner 
by proper joinder and pleading. (See Palle v. Industrial 
Com., 79 Utah 47 [7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222] ; Merchants 
Nat. Bank v. Clark-Parker Co., 215 Cal. 296 [9 P.2d 826, 
81 A.L.R. 778] .) The result is that W. B. Mellott, a partner 
in the firm of Gordon & Mellott, was an employer of petitioner 
Reed, and was undoubtedly liable to Reed for workmen's 
compensation. Since \V. B. Mellott procured insurance with 
respondent company to cover such liability, and paid the re-
quired premium therefor, the company must perform its obli-
gation by paying the award.' 
''The principle stated is supported by numerous authorities 
cited by the court and by many others. This entire line of 
authority is ignored in the brief of the respondents, although 
it directly supports the contention of the appellants that 
they, as individuals, were the real employers of the packing 
house workers. Respondents say that the packing house 
workers are as much in need of unemployment insurance as 
other workers, and apparently contend that this fact should 
influence the interpretation of the law by the courts. The 
same could be said of all agricultural workers and many others 
whose wages are tax exempt. We have only to apply the 
law as it is written. The argument of the respondents has 
an answer in the Kovacevich case (27 Cal.2d, pp. 549, 550) 
where it is said: 'While it is true that such legislation should 
be liberally construed so as to afford all the relief which the 
language of the act indicates that the Legislature intended to 
grant (California Ernp. Corn. v. Butte County Rice Growers 
Assn., 25 Cal.2d 624, 630 [154 P.2d 892]), the interpretation 
should not exceed the limits of the statutory intent. . . . In 
view of the express statutory intent to except ''agricultural 
labor," any labor which is essentially agricultural in nature, 
and which cannot be otherwise regarded by reason of any 
change in the custom of doing it, should not be included within 
the operation of the act by administrative or judicial legisla-
tion under the guise of liberal interpretation.' 
''The requirements that the employer of both exempt and 
nonexempt labor must keep the account of each employee so 
as to record the time spent in each type of employment in 
each pay period ( § 42, title 22, note 4 above) was met by the 
allegations of the complaint that such records were kept. 
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"We hold that upon proof of the facts pleaded by plain-
tiffs the court could properly find that plaintiffs were the 
employers of the packing house labor ; that not less than 80 
per cent of the packing house services were incidental to 
ordinary farming operations as distinguished from commercial 
operations, and hence were agricultural, and could properly 
conclude therefrom that all the wages paid were tax exempt.'' 
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the judgment 
and permit the defendants to answer if they be so advised. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 7, 
1954. Carter, ,J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[ S. F. K o. 18781. In Bank. Mar. 12, 1954.] 
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